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THE EFFECT OF THE NEW SEC RULES ON
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE
TAKEOVER STATUTES
Introduction
On December 6, 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) announced the adoption of new rules' governing tender of-
fers.' The rules address the current problems and abuses' in the
tender offer field by clarifying existing provisions of' and adding
new requirements to' the Williams Act.'
In addition to the SEC rules and regulations, tender offers are
regulated by state law. To date, thirty-seven states have enacted
tender offer legislation.7 The constitutionality of these state stat-
1. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240). The SEC is author-
ized to promulgate these rules under § 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
2. A tender offer is defined as a public offer by an individual, company, or group to
purchase a block of securities of a publicly held corporation for cash or securities or both. E.
ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR COmORATE CONTROL 70 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as ARANow & EINHORN]; E. Aranow, H. Einhorn & G. Berlstein, Developments in Tender
Offers for Corporate Control 1-34 (1977).
3. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329 (1979). The SEC release accompanying the new rules reads:
Rule 14d-2(b) is intended to prevent public announcements by a bidder of the mate-
rial terms of its tender offer in advance of the offer's formal commencement. The
Commission believes that this practice is detrimental to the interests of investors and
results in many of the abuses the Williams Act was enacted to prevent.
Id.
4. For example, the Williams Act does not define whether a press release, newspaper
advertisement, or public statement constitutes the commencement of a tender offer. Under
the new rules, these types of public announcements which identify the offeror, target com-
pany, offering price, and number of shares constitute the commencement of a tender offer.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
5. For example, the new rules define the minimum offering period for a tender offer as
twenty business days, whereas, prior law contained no minimum offering period. See 44 Fed.
Reg. 70,348 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a)).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
7. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.57.010 to -120 (Supp. 1979); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264 to -
1264.14 (Supp. 1979); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-101 to -108 (Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 36-456 to -468 (1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 517.35 to .363 (Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1901 to -1915 (1977); HAWAII Ray.
STAT. §§ 417E-1 to -15 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1979) (repealed 1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, §§ 137.51 to 137.7 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§
23-2-3.1-1 to -11 (Bums Supp. 1979); IowA UNIFORM SECuamEs Acr §§ 502.102, .211-.215
(Supp. 1979), reprinted in [1979] 1A BLUE SKY L. Rp. (CCH) 18.142, .161 to .165; KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1276 to -1285 (1974); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 292-560-.991 (Supp. 1978); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1500-:1512 (West Supp. 1980); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-817
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utes has been a constant source of debate.' Several recent court
challenges to state takeover statutes have been successful. Most
notably, in Great Western United Corp. v. KidweU1,10 the Court of
(Supp. 1979); MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 11-901 to -908 (Supp. 1979); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 11OC, §§ 1-13 (Michie/Law Co-op Supp. 1979); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 451.901-
.917 (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 80B.01-.13 (West Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
75-72-1 to -23 (Supp. 1979); Mo. Take-Over Bid Disclosure Act, 1978 Mo. LAWS S.B. No.
820, reprinted in [19791 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 1 28,201-28,214; NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-
2401 to -2417(1977); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 78.376 to .3778 (1973); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-
A:1 to :15 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 49:5-1 to :19 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 1600-1613 (McKinney Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78B-1 to -11 (Cum. Supp.
1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (1978); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-85 (Purdon
Supp. 1979); S.C. CODE §§ 35-2-10 to -110 (Cum. Supp. 1979); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. TT 47-
32-1 to -47 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-2101 to -2114 (1979 & Supp. 1979); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1 to -13 (1978); VA, CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1979); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§
552.01-.25 (West Special Pamphlet 1979); Tex, Administrative Guidelines for Minimum
Standards in Tender Offers 065.15.00.100-.800, reprinted in [1979] 3 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(CCH) TT 55,671- 55,682. The Delaware, Idaho and part of the Virginia statute have been
declared unconstitutional. The Idaho statute has been repealed.
8. Compare Aranow & Einhorn, State Securities Regulation of Tender Offers, 46
N.Y.U.L. REV. 767 (1971) [hereinafter cited as State Securities Regulation]; Langevoort,
State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L.
REv. 213 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Langevoort]; Moylan, State Regulation of Tender Of-
fers, 58 MARQ. L. REv. 687 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Moylan]; Wilner & Landy, The
Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Wilner & Landy] and Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon
State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Com-
merce Clause Limitations] (State statutes are preempted by the Williams Act) with The
Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 872 (1978) [hereinafter cited as A Response to Great Western] and Note, Securities Law
and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Statutes Reconsidered] (State statutes should not be preempted by the
Williams Act). Wilner & Landy argue that the state statutes are preempted principally be-
cause the advance notice and hearing requirements of the state statutes frustrate the pur-
pose of the Williams Act. Additionally, the authors argue that there is pervasive federal
regulation in the tender offer area and that certain takeover provisions, particularly with-
drawal and proration provisions, directly conflict with the Williams Act. Wilner & Landy,
supra, at 23-32. See also pt. I infra.
9. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho Stat-
ute); Televest Inc. v. Bradshaw, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 97,154 (E.D. Va. Sept.
3, 1979) (Virginia Statute); Dart Industries Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978)
(Delaware Statute).
10. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979). Prior to this decision, the federal courts had not ad-
dressed the merits of the constitutional claims. In Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enterprises, Inc., 456
F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the court did not address the merits of the preemption claim
raised by plaintiff. The court stated:
Any discussion of the merits of this argument would be premature, for it is not clear
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Idaho takeover statute
was preempted by the Williams Act. 1 In contrast, other courts
have upheld state tender offer regulations on the grounds that the
Williams Act does not implement a pervasive regulatory scheme
sufficient to establish federal preemption and that the purpose of
state tender offer regulation does not conflict with the purpose of
the Williams Act.'2
This Note will evaluate the constitutionality of state takeover
statutes in light of the new SEC rules. Part I will discuss the proce-
dural and substantive requirements of both the Williams Act and
the new SEC rules. Part II will describe state takeover statutes, the
purposes such statutes serve, and their effect on tender offers. Part
JIl will discuss the preemption question and will argue that state
takeover statutes are unconstitutional by virtue of their conflict
with specific provisions of the new SEC rules.
at this point that Delaware law actually requires greater disclosure in the present
factual context than does the Williams Act. Nor is it clear that any such discrepancy
runs counter to the policies underlying federal regulation of tender offers.
Id. at 494.
11. The case invalidated IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1979). The statute was
also invalidated on commerce clause grounds. The test used in determining whether a state
statute violates the commerce clause requires balancing the statute's burden on interstate
commerce and the legitimate state interests served by the law. See Raymond Motor Transp.,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441 (1978). A statute will generally be held to violate the com-
merce clause if it impedes the free flow of commerce between the states or affects an area of
commerce requiring national uniformity. See Southern Pac. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325
U.S. 761, 767 (1945). A statute will be upheld if it effectuates a legitimate state interest and
the burden on interstate commerce does not outweigh the state's putative local benefits. See
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). In Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell,
577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp. 443 U.S. 173 (1979), the court held that the Idaho takeover statute was invalid under
the commerce clause because the burdens of the statute were disproportionate to the legiti-
mate local benefits. The court recognized Idaho's legitimate interest in protecting incumbent
management as a corporation can influence local life style through charitable contributions
and civic involvement. In addition, the court recognized the legitimate state interest in pro-
tecting investors, but stated that this interest was substantially diluted 'since Idaho had
little reason to protect out-of-state shareholders, which comprised the majority of those af-
fected by the takeover hct. The court held that, in relation to these legitimate local benefits,
the burden on interstate commerce was disproportionate. The court noted that, in this case,
the Idaho law halted over thirty-one million dollars of interstate commerce. Furthermore,
the Idaho statute would compel a non-Idaho offeror to make burdensome disclosures beyond
those required by federal law. Id. at 1281-86. This Note will not discuss the commerce clause
issue. On the commerce clause issue in the preemption context, see generally Commerce-
Clause Limitations, supra note 8, at 1152-62; Wilner & Landy, supra note 8, at 15-23.
12. See, e.g., AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 48 U.S.L.W. 2441 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1979);
City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 514 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-11 (S.D. Ind. July 27, 1979).
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I. Current Federal Tender Offer Regulations
A. A History of the Tender Offer Device
Tender offers became a popular mechanism for acquiring control
of corporations in the 1960's.11 When compared with public ex-
change offers1 or proxy contests, 5 tender offers were considered a
superior method of acquiring corporate control.' The public ex-
change offer was disadvantageous because the transfer had to be
registered with the SEC in advance;" the proxy contest method
was costly because of the high price involved in soliciting proxies. '
Several economic factors also contributed to the increase in tender
offers in the 1960's, particularly the increased availability of credit,'9
the increased liquidity of acquiring corporations, 0 and the accept-
13. See Aranow & Einhorn, supra note 2, at 64-69; Commerce Clause Limitations, supra
note 8, at 1136.
14. A public exchange offer is a means of acquisition of control of a company through an
exchange of stock. The offer is made to the shareholders and frequently stipulates that the
offer of exchange will become operative only if holders of a majority of stock agree to turn in
their shares. Stockholders desiring to exchange their shares will deposit their stock by a
certain date with a named depository under a deposit agreement. FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 20-36
to -37 (4th ed. J. Bogen ed. 1964).
15. A proxy fight is a contest between management and insurgent groups for control of a
corporation in which proxies are solicited from shareholders. A proxy is an instrument given
by the shareholder to his agent giving him authority on all matters properly coming before a
shareholder meeting. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 382-86
(2d ed. 1970).
16. Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. Bus. REV. 136, 138 (1967);
Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 8, at 1138.
17. Hamilton, Some Reflections on Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269, 273
(1969). A public exchange offer requires registration of the security under the Securities Act
of 1933 and advance filing of a prospectus which subsequently must be given to tendering
shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1976). However, until 1968, cash tender offers were free of
regulation and there was no mandatory disclosure by either the bidder or the target
company.
18. See Cohen, A Note on Take Over Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus.
LAw. 149 (1966); HAYES & TAUSSlG, supra note 16, at 137. Hayes & Taussig note that Robert
Young's successful proxy fight for control of New York Central Railroad in 1954 cost more
than $1.5 million. Furthermore, their study shows that from 1956 to 1960, only nine out of 28
fights for control of corporations were successful.
19. Hayes & Taussig, supra note 16, at 138. The authors state that adequate financing
has been available to acquisition-minded corporations in the 1960's. The authors state that
the largest number of cash tender offers occurred during the fourth quarter of 1965, despite
high interest rates. They state that the lag in the response of cash tender offers to tight
money pressures may be explained by standby commitments for bank credit made by bid-
ders some months in advance. Id.
20. Id. See Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 8, at 1138 n.50. Hayes & Taussig
note that from 1960 to 1965 corporate cash generation after taxes and dividends increased
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ance by the business community of the tender offer as a proper
business practice.2
Concommittant with the tender offer's increasing popularity was
an increase in its abuse. Typically, a tender offeror would bid for
control in order to liquidate the target corporation's stock and use
the proceeds for the offeror's benefit.2 Thus, such tender offerors
were often characterized as "corporate raiders."2 To rectify this
problem, the Williams Act was enacted in 1968 as an amendment
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).24 The legis-
lation was designed to protect investors by requiring more exten-
sive disclosure of material information by the tender offeror to the
target company shareholders." The bill was also designed to pro-
vide "the offeror and management equal opportunity to fairly pre-
$3.4 billion. Because of the advantages of a cash buyout due to the absence of dilution of
earnings or control and the opportunity to buy control for a much smaller investment than a
cash acquisition of assets or merger, the tender offer became a popular mode of acquiring
control.
21. See Commerce Clause Limitations, supra note 8, at 1139 n.58. See also Hayes &
Taussig, supra note 16, at 138. The authors state that corporate managers and financial
executives view it as legitimate. The authors note that industrial companies which are held
in high regard in the business community, such as W.R. Grace, and Consolidated Foods, are
using this method of acquiring control and that at least seven firms listed in Fortune's "500"
were involved in takeover bids in 1966. Id.
22. Id. at 1137. See Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (offeror
purchased a controlling interest in target because target's principal asset, leaf tobacco, had
greatly appreciated in value. The shareholders were unaware of this fact. Offeror planned to
redeem the stock and then liquidate the company, thus appropriating the value of the to-
bacco to itself); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1971) (offeror did not disclose to tendering shareholders plans to either reorganize or liqui-
date target company and utilize surplus cash for its own benefit).
23. In his opening remarks in introducing the Williams Act, Senator Williams stated: "In
recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after white collar
pirates have seized control with funds from sources which are unknown in many cases, then
sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of the loot among themselves." 111
CONG. REc. 28257 (1965).
24. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967). In 1965, Senator
Williams had proposed amendments to federal tender offer legislation. This bill required
twenty days advance notice to the target company and thus protected incumbent manage-
ment. This bill was never released from committee. S. 2731, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, 111
CONG. REc. 28257 (1965). The Williams Act did not contain this provision for advance no-
tice. The new SEC rules have the same purpose as the Williams Act. See notes 71-83 infra
and accompanying text.
25. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968), reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2811; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967).
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sent their case"2 and to equalize each party's advantage over the
other.
B. The Williams Act
Section two of the Williams Act, adding section 13(d) to the Ex-
change Act,27 requires a person or corporation which becomes the
owner of five percent or more of any class of equity securities of a
registered company" to file a schedule 13D with the SEC contain-
ing certain information and to send the same information to the
target company.n Filing of this information must occur within ten
days after acquiring beneficial ownership of the above referenced
five percent."0 The Williams Act also requires the offeror to disclose
the amount and source of the funds for purchase, the offeror's
background and identity, and the extent of the offeror's holdings in
the target company."1 Where the offeror's purpose is to acquire con-
trol of the target corporation, the offeror must disclose whether it
plans to liquidate the target, sell its assets, merge it with another
company, or initiate any major change in the target's business. 2
In addition to this 13(d) filing, section 14(d) of the Exchange Act
provides that an offeror which acquires more than five percent of
any class of equity security by means of a tender offer must first
file a statement with the SEC.3 This 14(d)-I statement includes
the same information required by section 13(d) and, in addition,
requires disclosure of the source of funds used to purchase the tar-
get shares, past transactions with the target company,3' and other
26. See note 25 supra.
27. Section 13(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act applies to other transactions, for example,
open market purchases, as well as tender offers. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976).
28. Equity securities are limited to those that: (1) are registered pursuant to § 12 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (1976); (2) would have been required to be so registered but
for the insurance company equity security exemption of § 12(g)(2)(G) of the Exchange Act,
id. § 781(g)(2)(G); or (3) are issued by a registered closed-end investment company under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, id. §§ 80a-1 to -52. Id. § 78n(d)(1).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 and Supp. 1 1977).
30. Id. This information is filed on a Schedule 13D.
31. Id. Certain transactions are exempt from the requirements of this subsection: 1) any
acquisition to acquire securities made by means of a registration statement under the Secur-
ities Act of 1933, 2) any acquisition of beneficial ownership of a security which together with
all other acquisitions by the same person of the securities of the same class during the pre-
ceding twelve months, doesn't exceed 2% of that class, and 3) any acquisition of an equity
security by the issuer of such security. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 78n(d).
34. Id.
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material financial information about the offeror s The offeror must
also disclose any antitrust or other legal conflicts relating to the
tender offer if such information would be material to the sharehold-
ers in deciding whether to tender their shares." The offeror must
publish or send a statement of the relevant facts contained in
schedule 14D-1 to the shareholders of the target company.37
In addition to the filing and disclosure requirements, the Wil-
liams Act contains several provisions designed to protect target
company shareholders. First, a tendering shareholder may with-
draw his shares up to seven days after he has received the offer or
after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer if the of-
feror has not already purchased the tendered shares. 8 The com-
mencement of the tender offer is measured from the filing of a
schedule 14D-1 with the SEC.3 Second, if the offeror makes an of-
fer for less than all of the outstanding securities and more securi-
ties are tendered within ten days after the offer has commenced,
the offeror must purchase the additional shares pro rata. ° Third,
when an offeror raises its premium before the expiration of the of-
fer, the offeror must pay the increased consideration to all tender-
ing shareholders." Finally, the Williams Act contains a broad anti-
fraud provision which prohibits false or misleading statements and
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts by the offeror, target
company, or any other person. 2
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1979). Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(e) (1976), requires the offeror to disclose all material facts. In Sonesta Int'l Hotels
Corp. v. Wellington, 483 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1973), the court sets forth its definition of
materiality: "The materiality of facts allegedly misstated or omitted depends, in turn, upon
whether a reasonable investor might have considered them to be important in deciding
whether to accept the tender offer." A different standard for materiality was defined in the
context of proxy contests in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976): "An
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449.
36. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100(5) (1979).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
38. Id. § 78n(d)(5).
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). See also A Response to Great Western, supra note 8,
at 878-79.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
41. Id. § 78n(d)(7).
42. Id. § 78n(e). For an analysis of a tender offeror's standing to sue under § 14(e) see
Note, Standing Under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: May a Tender
Offeror Sue for Injunctive Relief, 8 FORDHAM URa. L. J. 405 (1979-80).
1979-80]
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C. The New SEC Rules
On December 6, 1979, the SEC announced the adoption of new
rules regulating tender offers.43 These rules apply to tender offers
commenced on or after January 7, 1980.11 Under these rules, a pub-
lic announcement by an offeror through a press release, newspaper
advertisement, or public statement which identifies the offeror, the
target company, the offering price, and the number of shares con-
stitutes the commencement of a tender offer."' The offer will not
commence on the date of the public announcement if the offeror
withdraws its offer or if the offeror files a schedule 14D-1 with the
SEC and contemporaneously disseminates its offering materials to
shareholders within five business days of the announcement." If
the offeror fails to withdraw its offer or file a schedule 14D-1 with
the SEC, he will have "jumped the gun"' in violation of section
14(d)(1) of the Exchange Act.47
Certain announcements do not result in the commencement of a
tender offer. A public announcement which identifies only the of-
feror and the target company and which states that the offeror in-
tends to make an offer in the future for equity securities without
specifying the amount or the price does not constitute the com-
mencement of an offer." Another exception is provided in rule 14d-
2(e) for an announcement of a registered exchange offer which dis-
closes only the information specified in rule 135(a)(4) promulgated
under the Securities Act of 1933."1 Such an announcement will not
43. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,236 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240). The SEC has also
proposed additional rules in 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349 (1979). These proposed rules include a defi-
nition of the term "tender offer," provisions requiring equal treatment of security holders in
the context of a tender offer, antifraud provisions concerning trading by certain persons on
the basis of material non-public information relating to a tender offer, and a prohibition of
certain purchases not made by means of a tender offer. The comment period for the pro-
posed rules ended on February 1, 1980.
44. Id. at 70,236 (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)).
45. Id. at 70,340-41 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)). In most cases, the
date of commencement of a tender offer will be the date when an offer or a summary adver-
tisement is first published. Id. at 70,340 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(a)).
46. Id. (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)(1) -(2). In disseminating the tender
offer, the offeror may choose either long-form publication of the offer in a newspaper or pub-
lication of a summary advertisement in a newspaper. Id. at 70,341-42 (1979) (to be codified
in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4(a)(1)-(2)). If a summary advertisement is utilized, the offeror must
furnish the offering materials to shareholders who request them.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d) (1976).
48. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,341 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(d)).
49. Rule 135(a)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 230.135(a)(4) (1979), provides: "In the case of an offering
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be deemed to constitute the commencement of a tender offer if the
offeror promptly files a registration statement."
Under the new rules, the offeror must file, "as soon as practica-
ble on the date of commencement of the tender offer," 5' ten copies
of a schedule 14D-1 with the SEC."2 The offeror must hand deliver
a copy of schedule 14D-1 to the target company and to any other
bidder.53 The offeror must also give telephonic notice of certain in-
formation and forward by first class mail a copy of its schedule
14D-1 to each national securities exchange where the target corpo-
ration security is listed and to the NASD if the security is quoted
on NASDAQ." Filling an omission in prior law, the new rules re-
quire that the target company must either mail the tender offer
materials to its shareholders55 or furnish the current shareholder
list to the offeror within two days of the offeror's request to do so."
The rules require the target company to publish a statement dis-
closing its position with respect to the tender offer within ten busi-
ness days of the commencement of a tender offer.57 The statement
must recommend acceptance or rejection of the offer, express no
opinion and remain neutral towards the tender offer, or state that
the target company is unable to take a position with respect to the
of securities in exchange for other securities of the issuer or of another issuer, the name of
the issuer and the title of the securities to be surrendered in exchange for the securities to be
offered, the basis upon which the exchange may be made."
50. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,341 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-2(e)).
51. Id. at 70,341 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-3(a)).
52. Id. (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(1)).
53. Id. at 70,341 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(2)).
54. Id. at 70,341 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a)(3)). NASD, the Na-
tional Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., was established as the self-regulatory organiza-
tion for brokers and dealers engaging in over-the-counter (OTC) securities transactions. The
NASDAQ, National Automated Quotation System, utilizes computer equipment to central-
ize the listing of OTC quotations. S. JAFFE, BROKER-DEALERS AND SECURrrIES MARKETS 207,
212-13 (1977).
55. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,342 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-5(b)). The Williams
Act and prior rules did not contain such a provision.
56. Id. at 70,343 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-5(c)). The shareholder list
must be given to the bidder within three days of its request or the target company must mail
the tender offer materials no later than three business days after the receipt of the tender
offer materials. If the target company elects to do the mailing itself, the offeror is required to
advance the approximate costs of the mailing to the target company. If the target company
furnishes the bidder with its shareholder list, it is not required to disclose the number of
shares held by each of its shareholders. The Williams Act and prior rules do not contain
such a provision.
57. Id. at 70,348 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(e)(2)(a)).
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offer. If a recommendation to accept or reject is not made, the
target company must specify whether it is remaining neutral or is
unable to take a position on the offer. Conclusory statements are in-
sufficient." The target company must also disclose, to the extent
known, whether any of its executive officers, directors, subsidiaries,
or affiliates intend to sell, tender, or hold shares in the target com-
pany." This statement is contained in schedule 14D-9.1
The information contained in the 14D-9 schedule greatly ex-
pands the disclosures required of the target company. 2 The target
company must describe any material "contract, agreement, ar-
rangement or understanding" and any "actual or potential conflict
of interest" between the offeror and the target company or any of
their respective executive officers, directors, or affiliates, unless the
information was disclosed in a document filed with the SEC during
the prior year, in which case reference may be made to the prior
filing." The target company is also required to disclose whether ne-
gotiations are proposed or are underway in response to the tender
offer which relate to or would have resulted in any of the following:
1) an extraordinary transaction, such as a merger or reorganization,
involving the target company or any subsidiary; 2) a sale or trans-
fer of a material amount of assets of the target company or any of
its subsidiaries; 3) a tender offer for or other acquisition of the tar-
get company's securities; or 4) any material change in the target
company's present capitalization or dividend policy.6 ' If an agree-
58. Id. (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a)(1)-(3)). The release states that the
reason for this new rule is to address a "problem area" in the field of tender offers. Often
management may
state its position when it maximizes its tactical advantage and . . . remain silent
when it does not. Such complete discretion increases the likelihood for hasty, ill-con-
sidered decision-making by security holders and the possibility for fraudulent, decep-
tive or manipulative acts or practices by a subject company and others. It is also
inconsistent with the neutrality between bidders and subject companies sought to be
achieved by the Williams Act.
Id. at 70,339.
59. Id. at 70,336, 70,347 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101, item 4). An
example of a conclusory statement is: "The tender offer is in the best interest of sharehold-
ers." Id.
60. Id. item 6(b).
61. Id. at 70,336, 70,347 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101).
62. Prior rules and regulations did not require the target company to disclose any infor-
mation. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1-4, 100 (1976).
63. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,336, 70,347 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101, item
3(b)).
64. Id. at 70,336, 70,347 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101, item 7).
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ment in principle between the offeror and the target has not been
reached, the terms of and the parties to the transaction need not be
disclosed if in the opinion of the target's board of directors such
disclosure would jeopardize the continuation of such negotiations.
In such case, disclosure that negotiations are being undertaken and
are in the preliminary stages will be sufficient. 5 The target com-
pany's schedule 14D-9 must be filed with the SEC as soon "as
practicable on the date" the target company's position is first an-
nounced to its shareholders."
In-addition to these procedural requirements, the rules contain
detailed substantive provisions. The new rules extend the mini-
mum offering period to twenty business days." Where the offeror
increases the offering price, the offering period following the price
increase is ten business days." A tendering shareholder may with-
draw his shares during the first fifteen days or after the sixtieth
calendar day if his shares have not been purchased." The with-
drawal period is extended ten business days after the commence-
ment of a competing offer.70
D. Effect of the New Rules
One purpose of the SEC in adopting the new tender offer rules is
to implement existing statutory requirements7 by providing
specific filing, delivery, and disclosure requirements, and optional
dissemination provisions.7" The majority of these rules will benefit
the target company shareholder. For example, rule 14d-2(b),7 3
which provides that certain public announcements constitute the
commencement of a tender offer, will help to eliminate arbitrage
65. Id.
66. Id. at 70,345 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9).
67. Id. at 70,348 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a)). The Williams Act did
not specify a minimum offering period. Nevertheless, tender offers usually remained open for
at least ten calendar days since section 14(d)(6) of the Exchange Act provides for an initial
proration period of ten calendar days in a prorated offer, section 14(d)(5) of the Exchange
Act provides for an initial withdrawal period of seven calendar days. 15 U.S.C. §
7S(n)(d)(5)-(6).
68. Id. (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(b)).
69. Id. at 70,345 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-7(a)(1)).
70. Id. (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(2)).
71. These requirements are contained in the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1976) and
rules and regulations thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1-4, 100 (1979).
72. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979).
73. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
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activity74 which is often triggered by a pre-commencement public
announcement. This activity entails the purchase of a target's
shares at the lower open market price for the purpose of tendering
such shares at the higher tender price." In addition, rule 14d-5,11
which requires that the target company either furnish current
stockholder lists to the offeror or mail the tender offer materials to
the shareholders, will provide for timely receipt of the tender offer
materials by the shareholders. This should aid shareholders in
reaching informed investment decisions. Also, schedule 14D-9,11
which contains disclosures of the target company's position with
respect to the tender offer, will provide more meaningful informa-
tion to the shareholder in his evaluation of the tender offer. Thus,
the effect of filing a schedule 14D-9 will be to protect investors.
A second purpose of the new rules is to reinforce the position that
the Williams Act is designed to maintain a balance between the
interests of the target company and the bidder."8 The extension of
the minimum offering period to twenty business days7" will benefit
the target company by giving it the time necessary to formulate a
response to a tender offer. However, the disclosure requirements in
schedule 14D-910 will burden the target company with the require-
ments of extensive disclosures and recommendations concerning
the offer. Similarly, rule 14d-5"1 burdens the target company by re-
quiring either production of shareholder lists or the actual mailing
of tender offer materials to its shareholders.
It is probable that the enactment of the rules, particularly rule
14d-101,11 which requires the target company to make certain dis-
74. Arbitrage activity refers to stock purchases by speculators in one market and the
near-simultaneous sale of the same property in another or the same market to generate a
profit. The arbitrageur attempts to purchase the target's shares at the lower open market
price for the purpose of tendering such shares at the higher tender price. This has an adverse
effect on tendering shareholders by reducing the number of their shares which were accepted
in prorated cash offers. This prompted the SEC to adopt rule lOb-4 which prohibits short-
tendering. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 2 at 173-91.
75. Id.
76. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text. One problem during the 1960's was
that in a contested bid, the bidder's effort to secure a stockholder's list was often met with
legal action to block the attempt. See Hayes & Taussig, supra note 16, at 41.
77. See notes 57-66 supra and accompanying text.
78. See note 26 supra.
79. See note 67 supra.
80. See notes 62-66 supra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 55-56 supra and accompanying text.
82. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,336, 70,347 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101).
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closures to its shareholders on schedule 14D-9, will cause an in-
crease in litigation. Because the target company is required to
make detailed disclosures, there is a greater possibility of its mak-
ing untrue statements or omitting material facts. 3
H. State Takeover Statutes
Since 1968, at least thirty-seven states have enacted statutes"'
that regulate tender offers.8 5 State statutes govern tender offers
when the target corporation is incorporated under the laws of the
state.86 Many statutes, however, also apply to corporations which
have substantial assets or a principal place of business in the
state. 7 Thus, many statutes have an extra-territorial effect because
they may apply to a corporation whether its shareholders live
within or without the state.88 Under most state statutes, filing of
disclosure statements must be made ten days before the offer can
become effective," although Hawaii, for example, requires that the
83. Numerous cases have been litigated under Section 14(e) of the Williams Act which
makes it unlawful for any person to make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to
state a material fact in the context of a tender offer. See, e.g., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v.
Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973); Gulf & Western, Inc. v. A&P, 476 F.2d 687
(2d Cir. 1973); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 370 F. Supp. 597 (D.N.J.
1974); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
General Host Corp. v. Triumph Am. Inc., 359 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). In Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), the court set the stan-
dard for determining liability under section 14(e). Plaintiff must establish that defendant
"either (1) knew the material facts that were misstated or omitted, or (2) failed or refused to
ascertain such facts when they were available to -him or could have been discovered by him
with reasonable effort." Id. at 364.
84. See note 7 supra.
85. The tender offer definition under state law is the same as the definition under federal
law, except that the percentage of stock varies. For example, Minnesota defines a takeover
offer as an offer to acquire any equity securities of a target company pursuant to a tender
offer if after the acquisition of securities the offeror would be the beneficial owner of more
than ten percent of any class of the outstanding equity securities of the target company.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80B.01(8) (West Supp. 1979).
86. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 203(c)(2) (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3765
(1973).
87. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-2m (West Supp. 1979) (incorporated or principal
place of business or substantial assets in state) and N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1601(a) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1979) (incorporated or principal place of business and substantial assets in state).
88. An offeror could avoid a state takeover statute by making an offer only to non-re-
sidents if a state only regulated offers to its residents. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 2, at
157.
89. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264.2 (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3771 (1973);
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 47-32-21 (Supp. 1979).
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filings be made sixty days prior to the offer.'0 Many statutes pro-
vide that the offer may be delayed by the state securities commis-
sion. 1 These agencies can, on their own motion, order a hearing on
the offer. In many cases, such hearings will be held at the request
of the target company." The state statutes have disclosure require-
ments which differ from those contained in the Williams Act.'3
While some statutes require an offeror to make disclosures similar
to those required under the Williams Act," many others require
that an offeror make more extensive disclosures."
State takeover statutes generally contain enforcement provisions
and remedies. Many statutes empower the state securities commis-
sion to issue both cease and desist orders and injunctions." A viola-
tion of these statutes may result in criminal prosecution, fines, or
civil liability."
The takeover statutes also have varying substantive require-
ments. There are differing provisions on the minimum offering pe-
riod, 8 extension of this period after an amendment to the filing,"
the withdrawal rights of shareholders,I1 and the time within which
the offeror must accept the tendered shares pro rata."'
90. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (1976).
91. See note 92 infra.
92. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1281 (1974); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-A:5 (Supp. 1977);
VA. CODE § 13.1-531(a)(ii) (Supp. 1979).
93. See notes 94-95 infra.
94. See COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 11-51.5-104 (Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
517.355(2)(a)(1) (1979).
95. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-3(b) (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1902
(1977); ILL. ANN.STAT. ch. 121 1/2 § 137. For example, the Georgia statute requires that
financial statements be filed. GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1902(b)(6)(B) (1977).
96. See, e.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421-A:11 (Supp. 1977).
97. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. § 292.991 (Supp. 1978); MIss. CODE ANN. H9 75-72-19,-21
(Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 552.19, .21 (West Special Pamphlet 1979).
98. COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (15 days offering period); 70
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 74(d) (Purdon Supp. 1979) (offer becomes effective in 20 days).
99. IOWA UNIFORM SECURITiES AcT § 502.212(8) (1979), 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH)
18,162 (14 days after an amendment); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978)
(10 days after an amendment).
100. See, COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (withdrawal within 15
days and after 35 days); VA. CODE § 13.1-530(b) (Supp. 1979) (withdrawal within 7 days and
after 60 days); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.353(3) (Supp. 1979) (withdrawal within 15 days and
after 60 days).
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (within 20 days after a tender
offer is made and within 10 days after an amendment to the tender offer); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
67-1264.5(3) (Cum. Supp. 1979) (within 10 days).
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Although the purported purpose of the state takeover statutes is
to protect investors,10 the main effect of the statutes is to protect
target company management from unfriendly tender offers. 03 If a
securities commission hearing is called, there is a delay of the offer
pending investigation. For example, under the Kentucky statute,'
either a director of the securities commission or the target company
may request a hearing within ten days following the filing by the
offeror. The hearing must be held within forty days and a judgment
must be made within sixty days of the filing. Consequently, a pos-
sible sixty day delay of an offer may result. In addition, state filing
requirements which require advance notice of a tender offer, as in
Hawaii, 05 allow target company management the time to devise
strategies to defeat the offer. Moreover, delay may discourage
tender offers'00 because it gives the target company time to organize
defensive measures.07 The potential for delay can increase the like-
lihood of irregular stock price fluctuations. Sizeable price fluctua-
tions often cause the SEC to halt trading in the target company's
securities between the time the offer is filed and first published.""
This can have an adverse nationwide impact and may inject uncer-
tainty into the tender offer situation.'0 ' Both the hearing and the
advance notice provisions protect management because they elimi-
nate speed and surprise which frequently comprise critical ele-
ments of a successful tender offer."'
102. See Appellant McEldowney's argument in Great Western, 577 F.2d at 1279.
103. See State Securities Regulation, supra note 8, at 767. The effect of state takeover
statutes' advance notice and hearing provisions has been to delay the tender offer thereby
giving incumbent management time to defeat an unfriendly tender offer. Id.
104. Ky. Rev. STAT. §§ 292.570, .580 (Supp. 1978).
105. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 417E-3(F) (1976).
106. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 2, at 234-76. Defensive tactics include: a tar-
get's repurchases of its own shares, open market purchases of the target shares by friendly
third parties, dividend increases, stock splits, issuance of additional shares, defensive merg-
ers, discriminatory voting provisions, triggering state takeover statutes, legal action, public-
ity and restrictive loan agreements. Id.
107. See Sommer, Commentary, 32 Bus. LAW. 1486 (1976). Statement of Joseph Flom at
an ABA National Institute before a panel on state takeover statutes and new takeover strat-
egies. A Report of the Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus.
LAW. 187 (1976); Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act; What is it? 21 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 681,
720 (1970).
108. See The Tender Trap, supra note 8, at 10-11.
109. Id. at 11.
110. See Moylan, supra note 8, at 691-92; Hayes & Taussig, supra note 16, at 139. An-
other effect of the state statutes is that their additional requirements expand the number of
1979-801
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III. The Preemption Doctrine
The fundamental theory of the supremacy clause"' of the Consti-
tution is that federal law may preempt state law."' While the pre-
emption doctrine is complex and requires a careful analysis of state
and federal laws,"' the current judicial trend is to allow concurrent
state-federal regulation."' The Supreme Court's most recent deci-
sions suggest that state legislation will be allowed to stand"' if
Congress has not clearly indicated its intention to preempt or a
conflict is peripheral to the purpose of the federal statute. Congres-
sional intent to preempt state law may be explicit."' In addition,
where the federal regulation represents a "pervasive scheme""'  or
legal grounds on which an offer may be resisted. See Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 8, at
517, and sources cited therein.
111. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursu-
ance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under Authority of the
United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
.Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
112. On the preemption doctrine, see generally Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A
New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959).
113. See Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
114. See Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the
Burger Court, 75 COL. L. REv. 623 (1975) [hereinafter cited as The Preemption Doctrine];
Note, Environmental Law: A Reevaluation of Federal Pre-Emption and the Commerce
Clause, 7 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 649 (1979). See generally Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257 (1979) (federal patent law does not preempt state contract law so as to preclude
enforcement of the contract); De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (California Labor Code
which prohibits an employer from knowingly employing an alien is not unconstitutional or
preempted by the Immigration & Nationality Act); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470 (1974) (Ohio's trade secret law is not preempted by federal patent laws); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) (exchange rules do not
preempt California law); New York Dep't of Social Service v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973)
(WIN provisions of Social Securities Act do not preempt New York work rules); Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (California statute concerning record privacy is upheld and
does not interfere with federal copyright law).
115. The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 114, at 653.
116. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel, 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (federal patent law expressly
preempts state law of unfair competition); Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n Inc. v. Clark,
482 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1973) (Federal Hazardous Substances Labeling Act expressly super-
sedes any state or local "precautionary labeling" law which differs from its requirements).
117. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1946). See Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1941) (1940 Alien Registration Act was comprehensive system for alien registra-
tion and preempted state law); Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). The Smith Act
as amended supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act. "Looking to all
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where the federal interest in the subject matter of the regulation is
dominant,"' preemption may be inferred. Finally, a state law may
be preempted if it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.""'
A. Explicit and Implicit Preemption of State Takeover Laws
Congress has not expressly prohibited the states from regulating
tender offers. 2 It is suggested that section 28(a)' 2' of the Exchange
Act permits non-conflicting state regulation of securities. 22 The
section provides that: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the ju-
risdiction of the securities commission ...of any state over any
security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provi-
sions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." In
Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell,"i' the court stated: "Noth-
ing in the 1934 Act explicitly preempts all state takeover legisla-
tion; indeed, section 28 has a contrary tone."' Others have argued,
however, that this type of savings clause is inapplicable to the pre-
emption question in the tender offer area because section 28 was
part of the original Exchange Act and was designed to protect state
Blue Sky Laws, not takeover statutes.'2
of [these Acts] in the aggregate, the conclusion is inescapable that Congress has intended to
occupy the field of sedition." Id. at 504.
118. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1946). See, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). "Congress having thus treated seditious conduct as a matter of
vital national concern, it is in no sense a local enforcement problem." Id. at 505.
119. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519 (1976) (federal statute preempts state statute regulating weight labeling of
flour); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (state law which does not relieve a judgment
debtor in automobile accident case directly conflicts with Bankruptcy Act which states that
a discharge in bankruptcy fully discharges all but certain specified judgments).
120. There is no express language of preemption in the Williams Act. Neither is there
any discussion of preemption in the legislative history of the Williams Act. See H.R.REP.No.
1711, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1968) reprinted in [1968] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2811; S.
RESP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). It is likely the preemption question was not
considered prior to the passage of the Williams Act because no state takeover statutes had,
as yet, been enacted.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78 bb(a) (1976).
122. See A Response to Great Western, supra note 8, at 909; Statutes Reconsidered,
supra note 8, at 519 n.63. "Nothing in the 1934 Act explicitly preempts all state takeover
legislation; indeed, § 28 has a contrary tone." 577 F. 2d at 1275.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1976).
124. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub nor. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
125. Id. at 1257.
126. See Langevoort, supra note 8, at 247. The author also suggests that state takeover
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Congressional preemption may be inferred where "[t]he scheme
of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the in-
ference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement
it."'" In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,"'2 a city
curfew of jet flights was held to be unconstitutional.'" The Court
held that the Noise Control Act of 1972 "reaffirms and reinforces
the conclusion that FAA, now in conjunction with EPA, has full
control over aircraft noise preempting state and local control." 3I
Although a question previously existed as to whether the Williams
Act established a pervasive scheme of federal regulation sufficient
to infer preemption, 3' the Act, coupled with the new rules and reg-
ulations, is such a pervasive scheme. The Williams Act is a mini-
mum disclosure statute which provides for filing with the SEC and
contains four substantive provisions: seven day withdrawal rights,
ten day pro rata acceptance, equal consideration to all tendering
shareholders, and an anti-fraud provision. 3 ' State takeover statutes
were enacted to fill gaps left by the Williams Act.'33 For example,
the Williams Act did not contain a minimum offering period.'34 As
a result target management and shareholders were deprived of the
time to assess the offer and to organize defensive measures.' In
light of the new SEC rules, however, many of the gaps in the Act
are closed, and, as a consequence, the state. statutes are superflu-
ous. The new rules establish what acts constitute the commence-
statutes are more akin to "corporation" law than to "securities" law and that it is too
mechanical to intimate that the savings clause was intended to save this more aggressive
state legislation. The author submits that where subsequent legislation is not of the same
character as the laws Congress intended to save, the savings clause will not protect sub-
sequent state law. Id.
127. See note 117 supra.
128. 411 U.S. 624 (1972).
129. Id. at 633.
130. Id.
131. Compare Statutes Reconsidered, supra note 8, at 519-20; A Response to Great West-
ern, supra note 8, at 910-11; and Langevoort, supra note 8, at 248; (Williams Act is not a
pervasive scheme of federal regulation); with The Tender Trap, supra note 8, at 29. The
authors argue that the Williams Act as integrated into the Exchange Act is a comprehensive
federal regulatory scheme and therefore preempts state takeover statutes.
132. See text accompanying notes 32-42 supra.
133. See Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal Regula-
tion of Securities Committee, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW.
187, 188 (1976).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1, -4 (1979).
135. See note 106 supra.
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ment of a tender offer' 3' and the length of the minimum offering
period.'37 The new rules also require the target company to furnish
shareholder lists to the bidder or mail the offering materials to the
shareholders."' In sum, the new rules coupled with the Williams
Act establish pervasive federal regulation, one criterion of implicit
preemption.
Congressional preemption may also be inferred where a domi-
nant federal interest in the subject matter of the regulation is
demonstrated."' The federal interest in the securities market is not
dominant, however, as exemplified by state Blue Sky Laws which
remain in existence. 140
B. Operational Preemption
Federal law will prevail when a conflict between federal and
state laws makes compliance with both impossible"' and when the
purpose of the state statute conflicts with the federal law."' There
are numerous conflicts between the new tender offer rules and state
takeover statutes, the most glaring of which is the discrepancy be-
tween state advance notice provisions"' and rule 14d-2(b)'. The fed-
eral rule provides that a public announcement by a bidder consti-
tutes the commencement of a tender offer."' Numerous state
statutes, including those of Arkansas and Nevada,"35 require publi-
cation or public filing of an offer before the offer may be com-
136. See notes 45-50 supra.
137. See note 67 supra.
138. See notes 55-56 supra.
139. See note 118 supra.
140. See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557-59 (1917) (Ohio Blue Sky Law up-
held); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 567-68 (1917) (South Dakota
Blue Sky Law upheld); Merrick v. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (Michigan Blue Sky
Law upheld). Concurrent jurisdiction in the securities field was reaffirmed in Merrill Lyn~h,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), where the Court held that New
York Stock Exchange Rules calling for the arbitration of any controversies arising out of the
termination of employment did not preempt wage relief under California law. Id. at 136. The
court stated that there was no need for national uniformity under federal securities policy in
the area of wage claims. Id.
141. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (196 2) (Treasury Regulations creating a right of survi-
vorship preempt inconsistent provision of Texas community property law); McDermott v.
Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913).
142. See note 119 supra.
143. See notes 89-90 supra.
144. See notes 45-50 supra.
145. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1264 to -1264.14 (Supp. 1979); NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.3771
(1973).
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menced.'" These conditions precedent to an effective offer under
state law will trigger the commencement of the tender offer under
rule 14d-2(b). 117 Because the federal provisions on the minimum of-
fering period, proration rights, and withdrawal periods are predi-
cated upon the commencement of the tender offer,"8 these periods
will not coincide with those provided under state law.
In issuing the new rules, the SEC expressed its intention to pre-
empt • state takeover statutes where there are conflicting provi-
sions. ' The regulations state:
Thus, the conflict between Rule 14d-2(b) and such state statutes is so direct
and substantial as to make it impossible to comply with both sets of require-
ments as they presently exist. While recognizing its long and beneficial part-
nership with the states in the regulation of securities transactions, the Com-
mission nevertheless believes that the state takeover statutes presently in
effect frustrate the operation and purposes of the Williams Act and that,
based upon the abuses in current tender offer practice discussed above, Rule
14d-2(b) is necessary for the protection of investors and to achieve the pur-
poses of the Williams Act."10
The federal rule on pro rata acceptance of shares differs from the
rule that presently exists in some states. The Williams Act requires
only that those securities tendered within the first ten days of an
offer be purchased on a pro rata basis.' In contrast, the Nevada
statute requires that offerors prorate tenders for the duration of the
offer.' Under the federal rule, shareholders who tender their secur-
ities ten days after an offer is made will have their shares accepted
on a first-come, first-served basis. However, in Nevada, a share-
holder who tenders his shares ten days after the offer is made and
whose shares are not taken up may assert his right to have his
shares prorated under state law. The offeror would then be required
146. See note 145 supra.
147. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,340-41 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)).
148. See notes 67-70 supra and accompanying text.
149. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329-30 (1979). In a recent interview, SEC Commissioner Pollack
stated that: "To the extent that our rules are inconsistent with provisions in some state
laws, the provisions of our rule would, of course, be applicable rather than the state provi-
sions . . . To put it another way, the state provision will have to kneel to the rule that we
ultimately adopt." New Rules Will Further Existing SEC Goals, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 17, 1979, at
35, col. 3.
150. 44 Fed. Reg. 70,329-30 (1979).
151. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1976).
152. NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.3772(3) (1973).
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to purchase more shares than originally desired.5 3 Some state rules
conflict with the federal rule governing the minimum offering pe-
riod. Rule 14e-1 provides for a minimum offering period of twenty
business days."' The Colorado statute, for example, provides for a
minimum offering period of fifteen calendar days.'5 Also, the new
rules provide for a fifteen day withdrawal period." The Florida
statute permits the tendering shareholder to withdraw deposited
securities within fifteen days of the tender offer and again after
sixty days.' 7
A state statute may also be invalid when it "stands as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."'' The state takeover statutes protect in-
cumbent management and represent local interest legislation.'
The Arkansas and New Hampshire statutes, which provide for
hearings and advance notice to the target company,'1° delay an of-
fer and thereby give management time to prepare strategies to de-
feat an unfriendly offer.'"' This conflicts with the purported pur-
pose of both the Williams Act and the new rules, which seek to
maintain neutrality between the offeror and the target company
153. Wilner & Landy, supra note 8, at 31.
154. See note 67 supra.
155. COLO. REv. STAT. § 11-51.5-103(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
156. See note 69 supra.
157. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.353(3) (Supp. 1978).
158. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67 (1941). See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519 (1977) (federal law governing net-weight labeling of flour preempts California statute).
159. See State Securities Regulation, supra note 8, at 767; Sommer, The Ohio Takeover
Act: What is it?, 21 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 681 (1970). "Careful analysis of [the Ohio] Act
would suggest that it is 'special interest' legislation sailing under different colors, weighted
obviously to protect incumbent management from attack." Id. at 720. See also Note, Take-
over Bids in Virginia, 26 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 323 (1969). "[Ilt is submitted that the Vir-
ginia statute while attempting to cure one evil creates only another- the further entrench-
ment of inefficient corporate management." Id. at 335. While it is asserted that the state
takeover statutes were designed to protect investors, the apparent effect of these statutes has
been to protect management. See notes 102-10 supra and accompanying text.
160. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-1264.2(2), (5) (Supp. 1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421-
A:3, A:5 (1977).
161. See notes 105-07 supra and accompanying text. It has been argued that delay fre-
quently also benefits shareholders. It encourages an auction market for the target company's
stock resulting in a higher premium for shareholders. Robinson, Directors under Attack in
New 'Bear Hug' Mergers, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1978, at 25, col. 1, 41, col. 1. Former SEC
Commissioner Sommer states that in some cases delays caused by state statutes have re-
sulted in a higher premium for target company shareholders. Commentary, 32 Bus. LAW.
1486 (1977).
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and foster more complete disclosure for the benefit of target com-
pany shareholders.' 2
Three recent court decisions, decided prior to the effective date
of the new rules, have invalidated state takeover statutes found to
be in conflict with the purpose of the federal law. In Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell,"' the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that the Idaho Takeover Statute was preempted by the
Williams Act because the statute's purpose to protect incumbent
management directly conflicted with the federal objective of inves-
tor protection.' The Idaho statute requires substantially more dis-
closure by the offeror than does the Williams Act.15 The court ar-
gued that disclosure of a mass of irrelevant data can confuse the
investor and obscure relevant disclosures.'" Thus, these provisions
impede the federal objective of aiding investors in making informed
investment decisions, and disrupted the "neutrality indispensable
for the proper operation of the federal market approach to tender
offers regulation."' 7 The court-rejected appellant's argument that
the advance warning and additional time provided by the Idaho
law allowed target directors the opportunity to fulfill their fiduciary
duties to shareholders "by studying the offer and either negotiating
better terms or making a recommendation based on shareholder's
interests."''6 The court noted that instead of allowing investors to
reach investment decisions based on full disclosure by the offeror,
162. See H.R. REP. NO.' 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811; S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, (1967). See generally Note,
The Courts and the Williams Act: Try a Little Tenderness, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 991 (1973);
Bromberg, The Securities Law of Tender Offers, 15 N.Y.L.F. 462 (1969).
163. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
164. Id. at 1274-87.
165. See IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (Supp. 1979) (repealed 1979).
166. 577 F.2d at 1274-87. The Williams Act required minimum disclosure by the offeror.
The Idaho statute requires significantly greater disclosure by the offeror and can thus con-
fuse the shareholder. The court's analysis in Great Western differs from the court's analysis
in Krouse. See notes 186-95 infra. The Idaho and Ohio statutes are very similar. Both con-
tain advance notice and hearing provisions. Nevertheless, the courts came to opposite con-
clusions. It seems that the analysis by the Great Western court is'superior. The difference in
court attitudes is perhaps the best explanation for the differing results.
167. Id. at 1279-80.
168. Id. at 1279. Corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty towards the shareholders. Ap-
pellant argued that the advance warning and additional time provided by the Idaho statute
give target directors the opportunity to fulfill their fiduciary duty to shareholders by study-
ing the offer and either negotiating better terms or making a recommendation based on the
stockholders' interests. Id. at 1279.
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the Idaho statute allowed corporate directors to make such deci-
sions."' The court states that this "fiduciary approach" of protect-
ing investors has been rejected by Congress. 7' The court held that
Idaho's statute was preempted because the "market approach" of
the Williams Act and the "fiduciary approach" of the Idaho statute
are incompatible.'
In Dart Industries, Inc. v. Conrad,' the District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana held that the Delaware Tender Offers
Act was preempted by the Williams Act.' The:Delaware Act pro-
vided for twenty day pre-offer notification to the target company.' 7'
The court held that the Delaware Act contravened the purpose of
the Williams Act by providing substantial advantages to incum-
bent management's efforts to defeat a tender offer.' Moreover,
specific provisions of the Delaware Act, particularly the provisions
for twenty day pre-offer notification and the twenty day minimum
offering period, directly conflicted with the Williams Act.7 The
court noted that Congress had specifically rejected a proposal re-
quiring offerors to give twenty days advance notice to the target
company'77 and cited Great Western with approval. 78
In Televest, Inc. v. Bradshaw,' the Eastern District of Virginia
invalidated a provision of the Virginia Takeover Act, which applies
the Act to open-market, unsolicited purchases. In its view, the Vir-
ginia Act conflicted with the Williams Act' because it defined a
takeover bid as an open market purchase of more than one percent
of the outstanding shares of a class of securities if the securities
have been acquired during the preceding six months.58 Under sec-
tion 14 of the Exchange Act, such an open market transaction
would not constitute a tender offer.' The court stated that Con-
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
173. Id. at 12-14. The court also based its holding on commerce clause grounds.
174. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(1)(a)(1978).
175. 462 F. Supp. at 12-13.
176. Id. at 13.
177. Id. at 12.
178. Id.
179. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) § 97,154 (E.D. Va. Sept. 3, 1979).
180. Id. at 96,370-71.
181. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-529(b)(iii) (1979).
182. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976).
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gress did not intend that open market transactions be regulated as
tender offers.'83 Therefore, the purpose of the Williams Act con-
flicted with the purpose of the Virginia statute provision. 84
In contrast with the foregoing decisions, both the Ohio and the
Indiana statutes have recently been upheld.'" In AMCA Interna-
tional Corp. v. Krouse,' the court considered several provisions in
the Ohio takeover law.'87 This law requires greater disclosure by the
bidder than that required by the Williams Act. Further, it requires
twenty days advance notice to the target company and provides for
administrative review.'88 The court did not find any direct conflict
between federal and state law, as "an offeror who proceeds under
the Ohio law encounters no proscriptions of the Williams Act and
is not hindered from meeting its obligations under the federal stat-
ute."'88 The Ohio law should be preempted under the new rules.
Ohio's provision for notice directly conflicts with rule 14d-2(b)
which provides that this type of advance warning would constitute
the commencement of a tender offer.'"
In AMCA, the Ohio district court concluded that the Ohio law
was not "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.""' The court stated there
was no indication that the Ohio law discouraged tender offers.",
Nevertheless, it is clear that, when contrasted to the SEC rules
183. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,371.
184. Id.
185. The Massachusetts Takeover Act was challenged but the court did not reach the
merits since the acquiring corporation withdrew its offer. Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Con-
nelly, 473 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1979). Similarly, the court did not decide on the constitu-
tionality of the Maine Takeover Law in UV Industries, Inc. v. Posner, 466 F. Supp. 1251
(S.D. Me. 1979). Ohio Attorney General William Brown, on behalf of the Ohio Division of
Securities, filed suit against the SEC seeking to invalidate the new SEC rule 14d-2 on the
grounds that the Ohio provision for twenty days advance notice gives investors greater pro-
tection than the SEC rules by giving the state and investors a longer time to review the
proposal. Ohio v. SEC, No. C 2-80-111 (S.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 15, 1980). The Commission
also contends that the SEC is obligated by principles of regulatory authority. The plaintiffs
seek a declaratory judgment invalidating the SEC regulation. Marcus, Conflict in Takeover
Laws Prompts Ohio to Sue SEC, Nat'l L. J., Mar. 3, 1980, at 8, col. 2; Wall St. J., Feb. 19,
1980, at 18, col. 2.
186. 48 U.S.L.W. 2441 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1979).
187. Id. at 2441-42.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 2441.
190. OfIfo REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(b) (1979).
191. 48 U.S.L.W. 2441 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 1979).
192. Id. at 2442.
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which protect the investor, the Ohio statute seeks to protect in-
cumbent management." 3 Through the advance notice and hearing
provisions,"9 ' the Ohio takeover statute gives target management
time to defeat an unfriendly tender offer, thereby protecting in-
cumbent management. The SEC rules contain neither advance no-
tice, nor hearing provisions. " ' Thus, under a direct conflict or im-
plicit preemption analysis, the Ohio law would be preempted by
the SEC rules.
In City Investing Co. v. Simcox,'" the United States District
Court for Southern Indiana upheld the Indiana Takeover Of-
fers Act."' The court held that the state takeover statute's provi-
sions for advance notice and hearings did not conflict with the
rights of a bidder to make a tender offer under the Williams Act.'"
The court concluded that there was no preemption since the provi-
sions of the state takeover statute are different from those of the
Williams Act."'
In light of the new SEC rules, this state takeover statute is pre-
empted. The Indiana statute's provisions for hearings and advance
notice to the target company prior to the commencement of a
tender offer conflict with rule 14d-2(b) of the SEC rules which pro-
vides that a public announcement constitutes the commencement
of a tender offer.2 "0 Furthermore, the purpose of the state takeover
statute, protection of incumbent management, 2"' conflicts with the
purpose of the SEC rules as demonstrated above.m Therefore, the
Indiana statute stands as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 2
193. See Sommer, The Ohio Takeover Act: What is it?, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 681-82
(1970); ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 2, at 153-72, 265-66.
194. OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.04.1(b) (1979).
195. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,236 (1979) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240).
196. 514 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) A-11 (July 27, 1979).
197. Id. at A-12.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1-3 to -7 (Bums Supp. 1979).
201. Provisions for advance notice and hearing protect incumbent management in that
delay gives management time to establish defensive measures against an unfriendly tender
offer.
202. See notes 158-62 supra and accompanying text.
203. See note 158 supra.
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Conclusion
Federal administrative rules can preempt conflicting state law.2M
The newly promulgated SEC rules preempt state takeover laws be-
cause they represent a pervasive scheme of federal regulation.0 5 In
addition, the new rules directly conflict with such state laws.20 The
state statutes protect incumbent management and, as a result,
conflict with the purpose of the Williams Act - investor pro-
tection .207
Although each state statute can be challenged separately, this is
costly for both individual plaintiffs and society as a whole. While it
may be difficult to gain support for explicit Congressional preemp-
tion of state takeover statutes,2e1 such action would put an end to
the unnecessary confusion of the investing public and obviate bur-
densome litigation.
Kathleen E. Slusser
204. See Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (Treasury regulations preempt state law).
205. See notes 127-38 supra and accompanying text.
206. See notes 141-57 supra and accompanying text.
207. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
208. In 1976, the Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee of the American Bar Association's Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law released a report in which it set forth the reasons why a
majority of the Subcommittee favored legislative preemption of state takeover laws. (One of
these reasons was the need for uniformity of law in the tender offer area). However, the
report noted that at the time the mood of Congress made federal preemption unlikely. See
Subcommittee on Proxy Solicitations and Tender Offers of the Federal Regulation of Securi-
ties Committee, State Takeover Statutes and the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAw. 187 (1976).
Furthermore, former SEC Commissioner Sommer stated that, practically speaking, the pos-
sibility of legislative preemption is remote. 32 Bus. LAw. 1483, 1486 (1977). Legislative pre-
emption has been suggested by several commentators in the area of Blue Sky Laws. See
Armstrong, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REv. 713 (1958); Millonzi, Concurrent Regulation
of Interstate Securities Issues: The Need for Congressional Reappraisal, 49 VA. L. REv. 1483
(1963).
